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I. Introduction
The trend  toward including  individual  accounts  as part of the mandatory  pension  system
continues unabated.  Nine Latin American countries  have introduced  individual
accounts  (Chile,  Peru, Argentina,  Colombia,  Uruguay,  Bolivia,  Mexico,  El Salvador  and
Nicaragua)  and several more  are preparing  to do so (Ecuador,  Dominican  Republic)  . A
similar  trend has emerged  in Europe  where the former socialist  countries  are taking the
lead: Hungary,  Kazakhstan,  Latvia and Poland have already passed reform legislation
and many others including  Croatia,  Estonia, Macedonia,  Romania and the Ukraine are
preparing  their own versions.  There is also movement in this direction in Western
Europe,  even in countries  with large, state defined benefit plans like Sweden. Several
Asian versions of the individual  accounts  strategy  are also emerging,  ranging from the
gradually liberalization  of Singapore's Central Provident Fund to Hong Kong's new,
employer  based,  defined contribution  scheme. In fact, reforms  that assign an important
role to individual  accounts  are being discussed  in dozens of countries  in every region of
the world.
Some  observers  consider  such  a reform  approach  as a shift away  from a social insurance
concept,  and  the tacit solidarity  across  and within generations.  A discussion  about indivi-
dual  accounts  versus  social  insurance  has recently  taken center  stage  again in the US with
the proposals to replace part of the existing unfunded, defined benefit scheme with
prefunded,  defined contribution  accounts. But in many ways, the US discussion is of
little  relevance  for most countries. The fiscal sustainability  problem  pales in comparison
to most other  advanced  economies,  coverage  is practically  universal  and private pensions
are well  developed  and play  a healthy  role in that country's capital  markets. Contribution
rates  for pensions  in many  European  and even  a large number  of developing  countries  are
double  those in the US.  In short, the potential  social and economic  gains of systemic
reform  are much greater  in the rest of the world. This is especially  true in poor countries,
where  the costs and inequities  of "traditional'  public  pension schemes  have led to their
demise  and low  credibility.
This brief  note states the broad  arguments  for individual  accounts.' The structure  of the
paper is  as follows:  Section II provides some needed clarification on "individual
accounts",  Section  III outlines  the main arguments  for individual  accounts  while Section
IV concludes.
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In the popular pension discussion, "individual accounts" are often used as short hand for
funded, privately managed, defined-contribution type pension arrangements. However,
this can be misleading since each of the main characteristics of a mandated pension
system - benefit type, financing and management - can be combined in essentially any
form and often are.  Of the 8 possible combinations shown in Table 1, the two cases not
found in practice are fully funded and publicly managed, defined benefit plans and
unfunded, privately managed defined contribution schemes.  This fact is interesting in
itself and suggests some natural selection process for pension systems that leads some
combinations  to become extinct or irrelevant.
Table 1: Examples of Mixi  g Benefit Types, Financing, and Administration
Publicly Managed (GM)  Privately Managed (PM)
Defined Benefits (DB)
Unfunded (UF)  Germany, France (basic  France (supplementary
scheme)  Scheme)
Fully Funded (FF)  Netherlands (supplementary
_________________________  __________________________  schem  e)
Defimed  Contribution
(DC)
Unfunded (UF)  Latvia, Poland and Sweden
___________________  (1.  Pillar)
Fully Funded (FF)  Singapore, Malaysia  Chile, Mexico, Poland and
I__  __ ___ __ ___ __ __  I_________________  Sw  eden (2. Pillar)
While the distinction between the 3 main pairs - DB/DC, UF/FF and GM/PM may seem
apparent, the distinctions are actually less clear-cut.:
Defined benefit vs. defined contribution:  It is easy to distinguish between  polar cases,
but in actual systems the differences are harder to pin down. A typical polar case of a DB
plan provides x percent of final pay for each year of participation , e.g., 60 percent of
final pay for 40 years in the scheme.  A typical polar case of a DC system provides the
accumulated contribution payments plus accrued interest at retirement,  which may be
then transformed into an annuity.  However, if we consider a DB system based on life-
time earnings (such as the German and the French point system) and compare it with an
unfunded individual account system or 'notional defined contribution' (such as in Latvia,
IPoland  and Sweden), the two kinds of benefit schedules are not very different at all.
Indeed, a DB point  system which  takes account of the remaining life  expectancy at
retirement and an unfimded IA scheme with earnings growth are algebraically identical. 2
2 An unfunded DC system, or notional accounts system, mimics the a funded DC system, but remains unfunded. As in
a conventional DC plan, individuals accrue their contributions and interest payments, but the interest rate is linked to a
return  consistent with its source of financing and unfunded status (i.e. wage growth related).  At retirement, the
notionally accumulated amount is converted into a pension  taking into account the remaining life expectancy and,
possibly, the notional interest rate.  See Disney,  1999 and Valdes-Prieto, 2000 for a critical assessment, and Palmer,
2000, for a presentation of main principals of notional accounts based on the Swedish reform).
2The other possible distinction between DB and DC concerns who bears the income risk,
which is said to be the plan sponsor in a (funded and unfunded) DB scheme, and the
insured in  a  funded  DC  scheme.  However, as witnessed  by the  many contribution
increases, benefit changes and special taxes on retirees in pension reforms over the last
decades, neither contributors nor retirees are immune to risks under a funded or unfunded
DB schemes.  The risk under  a notional accounts system is equivalent or potentially
lower than  in  an unfunded  DB scheme  (assuming that  the former has  an  automatic
mechanism for adjusting the annuity value with changes in life expectancy that the DB
scheme  does  not).  It  is  also  worth  noting that  in  many  funded  DC  schemes the
government reduces risk to the  individual through guarantees (of a minimum rate of
return and/or minimum pension), and/or acts as a guarantor of last resort.
Unfunded vs. funded schemes:  The typical and often politically flavored distinction is
that in one scheme the contribution revenues are used to pay current benefits (and hence
exhibits solidarity between generations), while in the other, claims on future retirement
income are prefunded (i.e., money is put aside).  But such a distinction may not be very
relevant at the macroeconomic level (depending on various factors).  In the end, both
schemes require a subsequent generation to fulfill the generational contract, either in the
form  of  current  contributions  (in  unfunded  schemes)  or  through  the  purchase  of
accumulated assets (in funded schemes).  Money put aside for retirement alone does not
change this fact and even the idea of investing in demographically younger countries (i.e.,
emerging markets) can probably help only at the margin to cope with an aging population
(Holzmann, 2000b).
Prefunding of demographic bulges (such as preparing for the retirement of the baby boom
generation) may help somewhat to achieve more intergenerational equity.  But from a
macroeconomic perspective, a similar outcome  can be achieved by reducing the public
debt, creating public assets, or even by leaving the next generation a lower environmental
liability (e.g., nuclear waste cleanup).  Managing a large reserve fund of a public scheme
on the  other hand,  creates problems  of its  own:  How  can investment decisions be
insulated from political interference, how will the power of a large state pension fund to
move markets be wielded, and how will the government behave as a shareholder in terms
of corporate governance?  While a  few international experiences may hold out hope,
(e.g., the Canadian investment board experiment begun in 1998) the experience is short
and may not be easily transferred to other countries, in particular developing countries.
The past experience with public management of public reserve funds is not encouraging
(Iglesias and Palacios, 2000).
Publicly vs. privately managed schemes:  Again such a distinction is easy for polar cases.
At one extreme, a monopolistic public administration can handle contribution collection,
record-keeping, benefit disbursement, and asset  management.  At the  other extreme,
these functions are performed by competing, private financial institutions subject to the
discipline of individual consumer choice of product and firm.  In reality, most systems lie
along this  spectrum.  For example, the public sector increasingly outsources functions
such  as  filing  and  record keeping  (information technology),  asset  management and
benefit disbursement.  On the other hand, the function of the private sector in a funded
system can be  reduced to asset management since contribution collection, filing, and
benefit disbursement may be done by clearinghouses (such as in Mexico and Sweden).
3In summary, equating "individual accounts" with a scheme in which the individual bears
the entire risk, which is fully funded, and in which all functions are performed by the
private sector is simply wrong.  There are many cases in  which such an approach is
sensible.  However, individualization of accounts at different points along the spectrum
can provide critical advantages which are discussed next.
III.  A case for individual accounts
There are many arguments for moving from typical unfunded, government managed and
defined benefit scheme toward individual accounts - unfunded and/or funded, publicly
and/or fully or partially privately managed.  The main arguments for individual accounts
have to  do with (i) political economy; (ii) population aging and (iii) incentive effects.
There are additional arguments for considering  (iv) a move toward funding and (v) the
use of the private sector for most or all of the administration.
(i) Individualization - breaking the reform deadlock
The attempt  to  reform a  public pension  scheme is typically  triggered  by  short-terrn
financial disequilibria which are further reinforced by concerns for long term population
aging, perceived distortionary incentives of the current scheme, and unequal treatment
between occupational groups, gender and generation.  In principle, all of these concerns
can be addressed by a comprehensive  but nevertheless parametric reform of the unfunded
DB system.  Standard measures include the use of lifetime earnings instead of final or
best years, reduced- accrual rates, actuarial decrements/increments for earlier/postponed
retirement, increase in the standard/minimum retirement age, a shift to price from wage
indexation, etc..  These parametric reform solutions have been known for many years and
were (Holzmann, 1988) and are still proposed in many circumstances (Chand and Jaeger.
1996) by  advisors  from  international organizations  like  the  World  Bank  and  the
International Monetary Fund. They were also intensively discussed in Latin America and
the transition economies of central and Eastern Europe, before systemic reforms were
eventually implemented, and continue to  be discussed in many EU countries.  These
reform discussions are often protracted and years often go by with little or no progress.
Where major reforms have taken place, in countries such as in the UK or Sweden, they
are characterized by  individualization and  a  shift toward  full funding  of part  of the
system.
The reason behind the reform deadlock and the possibility to overcome it through indivi-
dualization plus funding is essentially political.  First, reforms to the existing schemes
inevitably fall short of putting systems on a financially sustainable basis.  Politicians have
little incentive to do so, creating a credibility problem for the reform and hence an incen-
tive to oppose any reform from the very beginning. Second, in most countries there is not
only one  but  several public schemes which need to be  reformed and agreeing on the
financially sustainable lowest denominator hits the opposition of all others scheme which
provide more generous benefits in a non-transparent manner.  In contrast, proposals for
individual accounts that are based on individual equity - i.e., you get what you pay in -
are more difficult to reject.  Last but not least, mixing individual accounts with some
4change in funding creates coalitions and support among younger cohorts. 3 As  long as
credible guarantees to leave existing benefits for those close to retirement or already in
receipt of a pension can be made, the opposition from older cohorts can be successfully
defused.
Individual accounts, plus expectations of higher rates of return for part of the contribu-
tions which is funded, creates a paradigm shift which is able to break the reform deadlock
(Holzmann, 2000a).  The alternative is protracted debate and delayed reform, with major
strains on the relationship between generations and occupational groups and a weakening
of social cohesion.  It is the unreformed schemes, with their high and rising contribution
rates, past and prospective ad hoc benefit cuts, and unequal treatment between different
groups of the population which are a threat to 'solidarity',  not individual accounts and
funding. Furthermore, individual accounts provide a more transparent setting for meeting
redistributive or  'social  insurance'  objectives, in  contrast to  the old  scheme  with its
opaque benefit formulas and non-transparent cross-subsidies between schemes.
Matching public contributions (such as in Mexico) or minimum pension guarantees for
low income groups (such as in Latvia) can be used to guarantee higher replacement rates
and redistribution, protect against poverty in old-age, and provide incentives for formal
labor market participation. 4 Second, subsidiary social objectives can be pursued through
compensating contribution payments for periods of maternity, unemployment or military
service.  The requirement to make the payment from other social insurance budgets or
general revenues enhances transparency.
(ii) Individualization - a better concept to cope with population aging
Confronted with an aging population, both unfunded and funded schemes will be forced
to make difficult choices.  Either contribution rates will have to rise during active life,
benefits will have to be reduced after retirement, the ratio of working years to retired
years will have to be increased or some combination of all of the above.
Much of the current and future aging problem will be due to a positive trend, namely
increasing  life  expectancy. Assuming that  individuals prefer  a  smooth  consumption
profile over their life cycle, they will have to work longer in order to maintain a certain
level of income during their old age.  In addition, the possibilities for more flexible labor
market options  in  the future, the increased  importance of the service  industries and
increased labor mobility (including international) all point to the need for new thinking
on retirement and pension provision.
Broadly speaking, this kind of flexibility is more difficult in a defined benefit framework.
Benefit rules must be extremely complicated in order to avoid labor supply distortions.
For example, adjusting the retirement age to changes in life expectancy to keep the DB
system  financial  sustainable requires  a  political  decision, as  does  the  provision  of
decrements and increments for earlier and  later retirement.  The international evidence
3  Strong evidence of  this  support can  be  seen  in the  voluntary switching process whereby  younger cohorts
disproportionately  vote with their feet for individual accounts in reforming countries (Palacios and Whitehouse (1999).
4 Simulations for the US indicate that matching contributions can emulate the same distributive effects as the current,
progressive pension scheme (Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser, 1998).
5shows that actuarially fair principles are extremely difficult to apply in public schemes. 5
In  contrast, DC systems -can  provide this  flexibility without resorting to  a  series of
contentious political decisions to increase the retirement age or to implement actuarial
benefit adjustments for advanced or deferred retirement.  Since the accumulated amount
and the remaining life expectancy essentially determine pension level through the annuity
calculation, decrements  and  increments are  calculated  automatically,  and  when  life
expectancy increases, individuals receive a lower pensions  and react accordingly to a
lengthening of their work life.  Also, partial retirement and reentering full employment at
later age can be easily accommodated with fewer distortions according to individuals'
preferences.
(iii) Individualization - a better way of dealing with labor market incentives and
changing family patterns
Funded and unfunded individual accounts are not only able to render retirement decisions
more neutral compared  to  traditional DB  schemes, they  have also  less distortionary
effects on labor supply during work periods.  Since in traditional DB schemes the link
between contributions and benefits is generally not very tight, a significant part of the
contributions are considered taxes. Even if it is tight, the link is not very transparent with
a  similar  effect  on  labor supply and  tax  evasion.  An  individual account  does not
eliminate all  tax  aspects  of  mandated contributions  since  imperfect credit  markets,
shortsightedness, etc. would lead individuals to a different voluntary savings pattern.  But
the perceived tax component under individual accounts will probably be considerably
reduced, and the labor market outcome and the incentives to join the formal labor market
will be improved.
Individual accounts also allow higher mobility of labor between professions and nations.
DB systems are often differentiated between occupations (such as civil servants and the
private  sector), impeding  labor mobility  especially as a  worker gets  older.  Similar
mobility restrictions exist between countries with different DB systems. Even if the same
benefit structure under two DB system does exist, the mobility between the schemes will
generally lead to  a benefit loss. These impediments can be eliminated in a DC regime.
Individual accounts are also better equipped to handle changes in family patterns, i.e. the
increase in divorce, multiple marriages or relationships over the life cycle, widowhood.
and the resulting need for independent old-age security for women.  Under an individual
account system, accumulated resources (actual or notional) can easily be split after a
divorce for the period marriage, aggregated with own and prior contributions and interest
received, and supplemented by public resources in a transparent manner (e.g., for periods
of child rearing, etc.).
For a survey  of rules for early  or late  retirement,  see Whitehouse  (1999).
6(iv) Why add funding to individual accounts
Unfunded individual accounts can go a long way towards providing income security for
old age.  Yet unfunded DB and DC  schemes both share the same problem since they are
exposed to the same fiscal and political risks.  At the same time, funding may contribute
to increased saving, capital accumulation, and output under certain conditions.6
The internal rate of return of an unfunded scheme depends on the growth of the wage bill
while the rate of return of a funded scheme depends on returns on capital.  These returns
are imperfectly or even negatively correlated so that the income risk can be diversified
under a mixed system that consists of an unfunded (DB or DC) pillar, and a funded (DB
or DC) pillar  (see Holzmann. 2000a).  The diversification can and should be further
increased by  investing part of the  funded  scheme internationally.  Full  international
investment  (e.g.,  according  to  the  proportion  of  countries'  market  capitalization),
however, is an interesting but only theoretical benchmark since many conditions to make
it optimal do not hold in reality.
Prefunding part of retirement income is also a means of coping with the political risk. No
pension system  is  fully  immune to  political risk  and  thus  political  decisions which
negatively  influence  retirement  income  through  contribution  and  benefit  changes,
taxation, or inflation.  However, individualized and funded  provisions create a strong
political constituency against  such changes, and international financial markets are a
check against unsound economic policies.
As evidenced by recent reforms, problems with individual and funded provisions can
emerge, but they are not insurmountable:  These problems relate to the administrative
costs  and  the  potential  for reducing  the  net rate  of  return  for  members during the
accumulation period (discussed below) as well as the possibility for high costs in the
annutization process,  if  the  market  is  not  functioning  properly.  The  provision  of
annuities is important in order to insure against uncertain longevity and outliving one's
resources but poorly regulated markets and uninformed consumers can lead to high costs.
Appropriate regulation and information in a competitive market environment can address
these  problems,  and  mandatory  annuitization can  reduce  the  potential  for  adverse
selection issues (Walliser, 2000). Clearly however, this is an area where more analysis
and new approaches are required.
(v)  Why consider private management of funded accounts
Since individual and funded accounts - alone or mixed with unfunded retirement provi-
sions - seem to go a long way, one may correctly ask why private management of these
funds should be considered at all.  Would not centralized public funds be cheaper due to
potential economies of scale and the reduced need for marketing?  Perhaps, but does
public management provide the best risk-adjusted rate of returns, and is it conducive to
economic development?
6  There is an extensive literature on this topic which cannot be discussed in this brief note.  For a review, see World
Bank ( 1994).
7High administrative costs of privately managed individual accounts have been criticized
and in some cases, there does appear to be ample room for improvement. 7 However, the
real problem with high costs is the potential that the net returns on investments will be
reduced to levels that make the individual accounts poor vehicles for long term savings
(Whitehouse, 2000).  In addition, recent reforms have introduced innovations to keep a
lid on costs, such as competitive tender arrangements in Bolivia, checks on marketing
costs, or clearinghouse arrangements which can reduce private sector involvement to a
mere asset management function (such as in Sweden).  But the discussion of costs versus
individual choice is far from finished (James at al., 2000).
But from an individual and societal point of view, higher costs have to be compared with
the rate of return as well as the quality of services delivered.  And in both cases public
management does not fair well.  Most public pension funds are subject to a series of
restrictions and mandates that lead to poor returns.  Political objectives often lead to
social and economically targeted investments  and forced loans to  the  government to
finance its deficits.  These investments yield returns that are often below bank deposit
rates and almost always below the growth of incomes.  This contrasts with privately-
managed pension fund returns, which generally exceed income growth (see Figures 1 and
2 attached).
The low rates of  return found in  many publicly-managed schemes over  the last few
decades have direct and indirect negative consequences.  Direct consequences are felt by
members of partially funded schemes that must pay higher contributions during their
lifetimes or  receive  lower  benefits.  For  provident fund  members,  poor  returns (or
prescribed yields) directly reduce their retirement  savings and  make  it impossible to
maintain pre-retirement consumption levels.  Indirectly, the presence of these reserves
may lead to higher non-pension government deficits if target deficit levels are based on
the consolidated budget (Buchanan 1990).  Also, the diversion of an important pool of
long term savings to projects with low returns or for higher government consumption
implies an  important opportunity cost  for the economy.  Private capital markets are
robbed of liquidity and good projects do not find financing.  The larger the fund relative
to the capital markets, the greater is this cost.
Public management also creates problems with regard to  corporate governance.  Large
public funds would become the largest shareholders in the economy. In many developing
countries, this would imply a  significant renationalization of private industry.  On the
other hand, private management can produce positive effects on corporate governance
and enterprise performance.  The divergence of continental European and US economic
development  is  increasingly  linked  to  difference  in  governance  structure  due  to
differences in financial market structure and pension fund activities (Boersch-Supan and
Winter, 1999).
Equally important, private pension funds as institutional investors can make an important
contribution to  financial market  development  which  in  turn  can  contribute to  more
sustainable economic growth.  These effects are especially important for developing
countries where pension  funds and  insurance companies can lead to  quantitative and
7See  Rofman (2000) regarding costs in Argentina, for example.
8qualitative improvements in capital markets.  There is increasing evidence of the positive
growth effects of adding liquidity and depth to stock markets in particular. 8 The Chilean
experience of pension reform, financial market development and high economic growth
lends  further empirical evidence to  this hypothesis (Holzmann, 1997).  Recent cross-
country analysis lends further support to the close link between contractual saving and
high equity financing (compared to debt financing) of enterprises, longer maturity of debt
instruments, and higher liquidity (Catalan et al., 2000)
4.  Conclusion
Individualization  of  pension accounts can  significantly improve the  social  insurance
aspect of public pension schemes.  Since on a global basis, many of these schemes need
urgent and comprehensive reforms, individualization can help to make them financially
sustainable, more equitable and even more redistributive than the current arrangements.
Individualization of pension accounts is not equivalent to funding or private management.
While  partial  or  full  funding and  partial  or  full privatization can  add  value  to  the
individualization  approach,  individual  accounts  which  are  unfunded  and  publicly
managed have advantages of their own:  They can break the deadlock in reform, allow a
better way of coping with aging, and provide a better way of dealing with labor market
distortions and changes in the family structure. Adding full or partial funding can reduce
the political  and  income risks while having positive impact on  saving and  financial
market development.  Adding full or partial private management can increase options and
individual choice, enhance corporate governance and improve the rate of return of the
managed assets.
These perceived or  actual advantages of  an  individualized account  approach are the
reason why an  increasing number of countries are making it part and parcel  of their
reform effort.  Clearly, any new reform approach is confronted with new problems, such
as initially high administrative costs of funded and individually managed accounts.  But
innovations which are undertaken as part of these reforms cause optimism that the net
gains,  in  particular  in  the  context  of  developing  countries,  are  positive  and  large
(Holzmann and Stiglitz, 2000/01).
See for example Levine and Zervos (1996) and Levine (1997).
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11Figures:  Figures  1 and 2
Figure  1:  Difference between real annual  compounded  returns  for publicly-
managed  pension funds and real income per capita growth in selected countries
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12Figure 2:  Difference between real annual  compounded  returns  for privately-
managed  pension funds and real income per capita growth in selected countries
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The  trend toward including individual accounts  as  part of the mandatory  pension
system  continues  unabated. Nine Latin  American countries have  introcluced
individual accounts (Chile, Peru,  Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay,  Bolivia, Mexico,
El Salvador  and Nicaragua)  and several  more are preparing  to do so (Ecuador,
Dominican Republic). A similar trend has  emerged  in Europe  where the former
socialist countries  are taking the lead:  Hungary,  Kazakhstan,  Latvia and Poland
have  already  passed  reform legislation  and many others including Croatia, Estonia,
Macedonia, Romania  and the Ukraine are preparing their own versions.  There  is
also movement  in this dlirection in Western  Europe,  even in countries  with large,
state  defined benefit plans like Sweden. Several  Asian  versions  of the individual
accounts  strategy  are also  emerging,  ranging from the gradually liberalization of
Singapore's  Central Provident Fund  to Hong Kong's  new, employer based,  defined
contribution scheme. In fact, reforms  that assign  an important role to individual
accounts  are being discussed  in dozens  of countries in every region of the world
This brief note states  the broad arguments  for individual accounts.The  structure of
the paper is as  follows: Section  II provides  some needed  clarification on "indivicdual
accounts", Section  III outlines the main arguments  for individual accouints  while
Section IV concludes.
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